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SECURITY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF MANUSCRIPT HOLDINGS 
AT SOUTHERN ACADEMIC LIBRARIES 
Katherine F. Martin 
Part I: 
Administration, Staffing, and Physical Security 
Any study, however cursory, of the professional care and manage-
ment of manuscripts and related materials brings to light an important 
difference between the handling of such items and of other resources 
more commonly found in the academic library. Only in the domain of 
the rare book librarian is the manuscript curator's emphasis on pres-
ervation, rather than the more characteristic accent on service, mir-
rored. 
Preservation and protection have traditionally been the maxims 
of those responsible for manuscript and archival materials. This 
orientation has developed naturally out of the recognition of the 
Wliqueness of such resources and their consequent historical and mone-
tary value. With the development in this century of a new apprecia-
tion for original source materials, the manuscript curator bas more 
and more come to realize the need to balance the objectives of preser-
vation and service. Hence a middle ground between answering the de-
mands of today's patron and insuring the preservation of irreplace-
able records of the past for the enlightenment of future generations 
has become the goal of the responsible administrator. 
The last quarter century has seen the evolution of a growing uni-
formity in principle and practice where the security of manuscript 
collections has been concerned. The goal has been the reduction of 
physical damage and impaired usefulness caused by both human tampering 
and such natural enemies as fire and water. If the emphases in the 
professional literature can be accepted as accurate gauges of archi-
vists' concerns, an increased awareness of security problems in gen-
eral and a growing first-hand contact with theft and mutilation in 
particularl have focused attention on the problem of insuring preser-
vation while continuing to provide service to qualified applicants. 
Any reluctance to codify and uniformly enforce security regulations 
has largely disappeared; and a.formal onslaught on security problems, 
highlighted by the Society of American Archivists' creation of an 
Archival Security Program in lg7s, has been initiated. 
In the development of a professional consensus on what is desir-
able if not always attainable in security procedures, attention has 
frequently been focused on combatting thievery. Changes in staff 
training, surveillance techniques, exit control, physical arrangement 
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of collections, inventorying, marking of manuscripts, and the screen-
ing, registration, and regulation of the reading room conduct of 
patrons have been implemented in developing defenses against theft. 
The role of fire and int~uder detection devices and of records on the 
use and duplication of materials in improving security and collection 
control has also been widely recognized . Complete and accurate rec-
ords have proven crucial as well to the recovery of missing items and 
the collection of insurance premiums. In order to combat both "know-
ing and innocent destruction and abuse"2 in all sectors, blind confi-
dence and public faith have been abandoned and a variety of precau-
tionary measures instituted. 
What then have emerged as the primary keys to achieving the c rit-
ical balance between collection security and maintaining accessibil-
ity? Two closely connected areas have been most frequently discussed 
in the literature: the selection and training of personnel and the 
regulation of readers. 
Security begins with the screening and s c rutiny of those employed 
by the repository and of all others having acces s to the premises, in-
cluding the maintenance, housekeeping, and other professional staff of 
the institution. Starf attitude, particularly as it arfects security 
procedures involving interaction with patrons, has also been recog-
nized as crucial . As James B. Rhoads , then Assistant Archivist for 
Civil Archives at the National Archives, noted in 1966, the training 
and indoctrination of staff members must revolve around the precept 
that "a good archivist must also be suspici ous." He encouraged the 
development of "collective vigilance" as a professional trait, believ-
ing it to be particularly valuable in discouraging the professional 
thief.3 
It is, however, as it affects relations with potential readers 
that manuscript security has received the greatest attention. A 
series of procedures which, as a whole, provide for complete control 
of public use is commonly advocated. It is widely recommended that 
. credentials of a potential researcher be carefully reviewed, his re-
search purposes determined, and he be provided a written explanation 
of the rules governing access. All personal possessions not essential 
to the use of manuscripts are to be left outside the reading room; in 
many instances it is suggested that only pencil and paper be allowed. 
To monitor the actual use of collections, direct starf supervision, 
daily registration, use of signed request forms, and limits on the 
amount of manuscript material provided at one time are recommended. 
Other favored security measures include such access controls as 
restricted entry to stack areas and staff supervision of duplicating 
procedures . Even where such strict precautions are exercised, many 
observers also recommend inventorying materials following their use 
and examining patron possessions on departure.4 
In support of such use regulations , a number of physical proce-
dures have been developed; these also provide protection against 
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after-hours theft and environmental hazards. These measures include 
the control of access to collection facilities, installation of de-
vices to warn of fires and intruders, arranging for special storage 
for particularly valuable items, providing protective devices for 
displays, and preparing thorough descriptions of a collection's hold-
ings. Foremost among these precautionary measures, however, are 
those which reduce the dangers connected with the handling of manu-
scripts. Recommended procedures include, for example, the substitu-
tion of copies for valuable items in order to avoid wear, reduce the 
possibility of theft, and provide proof of ownership in the event the 
original is stolen and subsequently recovered.5 
A related, although far more controversial, practice is the mark-
ing of certain manuscripts with an indelible insigne of ownership. 
While some believe that such alteration or defacement is to be dis-
couraged, many authorities agree that the practice can be of value 
when selectively applied to those items which are both valuable and 
marketable, and thus most likely to tempt the professional thief.6 
The recommendations that have been made by earnest and well-
qualified analysts of the security problem constitute~ .!2!£ a com-
prehensive program for manuscript preservation that does not interfere 
with use by qualified applicants. It remains to be determined, how-
ever, to what extent such proposals have been and can be translated 
into practice. What is not to be found in the literature is an indi-
cation of the degree to which such procedures have been implemented.7 
This study, conducted early in 1979, was designed to examine the 
correlation between the theory propounded in the literature and the 
safeguards actually employed by those institutions responsible for the 
housing and protection of manuscripts. A questionnaire covering the 
areas of administration, staffing, physical security, reader services, 
insurance, and collection control was developed for this purpose. 
Academic library repositories were surveyed in order to provide infor-
mation on a broad variety of manuscript materials, collection sizes, 
administrative structures, and financial conditions. It was also 
hoped that by this limitation of recipients to a single, although ad-
mittedly heterogeneous, type of repository that the problem of errone-
ous generalization could be avoided. 
Questionnaires were distributed to institutional libraries in Ala-
bama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia so that a cross 
section of academic library situations broad enough to permit national 
as well as regional conclusions might be obtained. At the same time, 
this geographic limitation insured that the number of responses would 
remain manageable. This was not a random sampling of the academic 
libraries in the region, but an attempt at a comprehensive polling of 
the institutions where manuscripts were to be found, whether in sepa-
rate collections , institutional archives, or multimedia special collec-
tions, or as isolated items. Provision was made for anonymity on the 
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part of the respondent. 
Libraries were included in the survey on the basis of descrip-
tions of special collections contained in the 1976-1977 and 1978 
issues of the American Library Directory and the lists of repositories 
included in Philip M. Hamer•s f!! Guide .12. Archives~ Manuscripts i!!. 
~United~. the National~ Catalog of Manuscript~­
tions, J. Albert Robbins • s American Literary Manuscripts, and f!! ~­
list £!. Holdings i!!. Academic, Historical ~ ~ Libraries, ~­
ums, and Authors' Homes in the United States {2d ed.).B Where these 
soorce;-proved inc~si,;"e-;-I'ndividuaTCOilege catalogs were also 
consulted. 
Those libraries whose holdings appeared to consist wholly of oral 
history transcripts or tapes or of college archives were excluded from 
this survey. Where multiple libraries on a single campus had manu-
script holdings, all were slated for separate surveying. When the 
pre sence or absence of manuscript materials could not be confirmed, 
institutions were included in order to avoid omission of any reposi-
tories. 
The result was a list of 210 academic libraries. During the 
month-long survey period, some type of response was received from 129 
of these (61 . 4%); however, only 86 {40.9%) were usable in this proj-
ect . Most of those eliminated reported having no manuscript materi-
als . 
It is hoped that analysis of the information obtained through the 
survey will contribute to an understanding of the way in which secur-
ity policies and procedures in individual repositories differ with 
size of collection, administrative structure, and the nature of the 
host institution. While the impact of financial constraints does not 
go unrecognized, this evaluation should also illustrate institutional 
priorities and preferences as they relate to the range of security 
procedures that can be implemented. Finally, it is hoped that this 
study will aid in identifying areas in need of continued attention and 
improvement . 
The nature of the security measures prevailing in the institu-
tions participating in this survey might tentatively be explained by 
the relative youth of those manuscript collecting programs. Sixty-six 
institutions reported the founding date of the manuscript collection 
or the collecting practice of their libraries. Only eight (12.1%) of 
these respondees laid claim to pre- twentieth century origins, with 
three dating from the 1830's. Thirty-six (54.5%) reported that manu-
scripts had become part of their library holdings only in the lg6o•s 
and 1970•s, with this number evenly divided between the two decades . 
The youngest collections were established in 1977. 
A similar clustering of responses characterized the reports of 
the number of separate manuscript groups administered by each reposi-
tory. Of the sixty-five respondents on this topic , twenty-one (32.3%) 
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held fewer than twenty- five such groups, while another twen ty ( 30 . 7%) 
had between twenty- five and one hundred. Only six collections 
(9.23%) administer ed more t han one thousand manuscript groups . 9 
The majority of the manuscript collections in the responding 
libraries were not only recently established and fairly small but were 
also administered jointly with other special materials; this was true 
in fifty- ni ne (68.6%) cases. Only twenty- two institutions {25.6%) r e-
ported havi ng separat e manuscript departments in their libraries. In 
four insti t utions manuscript holdings were under the jurisdiction of 
the reference department . 
Whatever the size of the collection, and whether it was adminis-
tered separ ately or i n conjunction with other mater ials, it was de-
pendent for its security first and foremost upon the staff responsible 
for its care and management. In the majority of libraries surveyed, 
manuscripts were administered by a very small number of staff members . 
Of the seventy- nine institutions providing information about their 
personnel, thirty- one {39 . 24%) reported that manuscript materials were 
the concern of only one full - time professional staff member , who had 
either one or no full - time nonprofessional assistant. Eighteen 
libraries {22 . 78%) had only one full-time staff member with responsi-
bility for their manuscript collections . The largest staff reported 
numbered thirty-eight full-time employees, including five p r ofession-
a ls; two other libraries had combined full- time staf fs of t hirteen 
individuals in the department responsible for manuscript holdings. 
Very few institutions noted the presence of numerous part-time staff 
members; for the most part, these appeared to be students with limited 
duties. 
The first factor in security is prevention, and, whatever its 
size or training, the alertness and general reliability of the staff 
are critical elements in achieving this goal. Staff contributions to 
an effective security program can include, in addition to such ex-
pected expedients as careful surveillance and the regulation of patron 
behavior, the maintenance of a reliable catalog and other fi nding 
aids, regular inventorying of at least the more important individual 
items, and the preparation and long- term preservation of access logs, 
all of vital aid in the identification and recovery of materials. 
Surprisingly, in spite of strong recommendations to the contrary 
in the literature,10 few of the responding libraries appear to have 
any formal organization for security purposes; this is true of both 
the individual departments and of the library systems. Only in eigh-
teen {22.2%) of the eighty-one institutions that provided information 
on this topic is there a library security officer. And in only two 
repositories {2 . 46%), both of which number among the largest collec-
tions, is there an individual who can be considered a staff security 
officer in the manuscript department; even here, the allocation of 
this responsibility is informal and does not reflect any special 
t r aining . 
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Few libraries run security checks on those responsible for manu-
script materials, although the participation of insiders in the theft 
of these items has been amply demonstrated in recent years . Only in 
six (7.69%) of the seven~y-eight institutions responding to this 
query were such background investigations conducted, and then not al-
ways as a regular practice . In certain repositories only those whom 
the staff already knew or who were recommended by tru.sted mutual ac-
quaintances were ordinarily hired. The general absence of such formal 
precautions might well be attributed to the nature of institutional 
hiring policies, and to limits on time and resources, as well as a 
natural reluctance to go beyond the written record and personal im-
pressions. 
One of the simplest and most economical securi ty measures is the 
use of staff identification badges . Yet only one library among the 
eighty-six respondents makes such a demand of both its special collec-
tions and regular staff; another limits this practice to the student 
assistants in its manuscript department. In five other cases the 
wearing of such badges is optional, and it is under consideration in 
a sixth. The small size of many staffs would, of course, limit the 
need for such identification for security purposes. Yet the practice 
would be helpful in distinguishing between nondepartmental staff and 
outsiders for the pw:poses of restricting access and challenging in-
truders. 
Supplementing the activities of a carefully selected and well-
trained staff and, in fact, making worthwhile their security con-
sciousness is a secure physical plant . This is effected through the 
implementation of a variety of procedures which support surveillance 
efforts and enhance physical security without unduly impeding or in-
conveniencing the public. What archivist Theodore R. Schellenberg 
wrote of archival construction is equally applicable to the quarters 
housing a manuscript collection: "An archival building should be de-
signed for the purpose of protecting and making accessible to the ut-
most degree the contents of the building.nll One of the simplest 
ways to promote security is by limiting the number of public entrances 
that need to be observed during operating hours and made fast against 
intrusion at others. On this point the majority of those su.rveyed 
score high, with sixty-two (72.09%) having only one entry to the area 
housing the collection. Another thirteen (15.1%) reported two en-
trances, while four (4.65%) have three entries. 
Exit control during operating hours mirrors this limitation on 
access to the collection area. Seventy-two (83.72%) of the eighty-six 
institutions surveyed employ some type of observation or inspection 
designed to prevent unauthorized removal of manuscript materials. Of 
these, twenty-eight (38 . 8%) require patrons to check out with a staff 
member stationed in the exit area . Twelve more (16.6%) rely on a more 
informal observation of those departing. The building exit control 
facilities suffice for another five (6. 94%) . Twenty-two repositories 
(25.5%) employ more rigorous measures, with eleven maintaining locked 
quarters at all times, five possessing door alarms or buzzers to 
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control unapproved exit, and six relying on habitual inspection of 
either materials used by the patron or his personal possessions. Of 
the remaining nineteen repositories, five utilize some unspecified 
form of exit control while nine depend on public trustworthiness 
alone. 
An equal variety in method, including use of both local and ex-
ternally connected alarm systems, lock and key control, and after-
hours lighting, characterizes the prevention of unauthorized entry 
after hours. By far the most popular of these provisions is lock and 
key control, with eighty (95.2%) of the eighty-four respondents to 
this question indicating their reliance on this procedure. Approxi-
mately one-fourth of the libraries employ security guards (22 . 6%) or 
after-hours lighting (25%), either singly or in combination with other 
practices. Some thirty-nine 0£ the responding repositories (46.4%) 
use a combination of preventatives. Twenty- three employ a pair of 
protective measures, twelve rely on three approaches, and two utilize 
either four or five means of restricting entry. The most common com-
binations are lock and key control and after-hours lighting (seven 
institutions) or lock and key controls and security guards (six insti-
tutions). 
Forty-three (50%) of the security systems were described as being 
part of overall library security and thirty-three (38.3%) as peculiar 
to the department housing manuscripts. In six instances intruder con-
trol shared certain characteristics with the entire building while 
also introducing individual features. Not surprisingly, twice as many 
of the multiple element systems were part of total library security 
(twenty-three) as were peculiar to the administering departments 
(eleven). 
Successful after- hours security also demands severe limitations 
on the number of individuals permitted access at such times . Ideally, 
no one other than tested members of the departmental staff should be 
allowed unsupervised after-hours access. Such is the case in twenty-
one (24.7%) of the eighty-five libraries addressing themselves to this 
topic; sixteen more (18.8%) are even more security conscious, with no 
one granted after-hours entry. For the most part, however, the 
library staff is generally extended this privilege; fifty- two (61.17%) 
of the repositories permit such access to departmental staff and 
twenty-nine more (34.1%) to other staff members. 
Security (twenty-four respondents or 28 . 2%) or maintenance and 
housekeeping (thirty-four respondents or 40%) personnel are frequently 
allowed after-hours access. In two institutions only the security and 
housekeeping personnel are then admitted. Yet, only four departments 
(4.7%) allow faculty such entry, with three (3.5%) extending the priv-
ilege to graduate students; one institution grants access to both 
parties . Twelve institutions (14.1%) include another individual in 
this privileged group; as a rule, this is the library director or uni-
versity librarian. One repository permits the university historian 
and his assistants such access . 
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Another means of providing protection to the collection, particu-
larly to its exceptionally valuable items, is the use of a vault or 
such substitutes as locked closets, storage cabinets, or stack areas. 
The widespread appreciation of such security devices is reflected in 
their use by fifty-one (59.3%) of the responding institutions. While 
only seventeen repositories have an actual vault, another thirty-one 
employ some other type of special locked storage. These facilities 
are frequently well-utilized. Of the forty libraries estimating the 
number of manuscripts so stored, five reported that all items are so 
housed . It should be noted, however, that some repositories frown on 
this segregation of special items in a vault or similar storage area, 
believing that the practice merely makes valuable materials more vul-
nerable to theft and total destruction by fire or flood. 
To be truly effective as a security procedure, such safekeeping 
should be accompanied by the use of a log registering the removal and 
return of manuscripts, and by limiting access to the storage area. 
Yet only seventeen (33.3%) of those so housing materials maintain any 
such records. Similarly, of the twenty-seven libraries which limit 
the staff who have access to such storage quarters, fourteen (51.8%) 
permit entry to three or more individuals. Twenty-three report that 
these areas are open to all staff members, although in some instances 
it is not clear whether this means only departmental or all library 
personnel. 
Special protection against human foes also needs to be afforded 
to manuscript materials on exhibit, common victims of thievery. While 
the use of a local alarm system is recommended to protect these items, 
with the warning that it should not be audible to the intruder who in 
his panic might cause greater damage,12 such a device is rarely em-
ployed. The Burns Security Institute•s National Survey 2!! Library 
Security, published in 1973, found that 70 percent of the public 
libraries it polled provided no special protection for valuable dis-
plays.13 Manuscript repositories can claim no better record. While 
seventy-seven (98.7%) of the seventy-eight libraries which maintain 
manuscript exhibits do provide locked cases, only three (3.84%) also 
employ an alarm system. 
The protection provided for valuable or particularly vulnerable 
manuscript items through vaults or locked exhibit cases can also be 
extended to the bulk of the collection by curtailing stack access dur-
ing operating hours. Surveillance of the reading room and the exer-
cise of physical collection controls are useless as security proce-
dures if outsiders are permitted unattended admission to storage 
areas. Such a restriction is, in fact, one of the four basic require-
ments for collection security put forth by James B. Rhoads in his 
landmark article, "Alienation and Thievery: Archival Problems.nl4 In 
thirty- eight (53.52%) of the seventy-one libraries having formal stor-
age areas, patrons are permitted a certain freedom of access. How-
ever, the exercise of this privilege ftequently requires that a staff 
member be in attendance. 
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These precautions are geared primarily to the prevention of 
theft, but the thorough repository is also concerned with the protec-
tion of fragile items from both innocent and intentional abuse. One 
procedure that fulfills both functions is limiting access to certain 
materials. Fifty-six of those surveyed (65.1%) restrict the use of 
certain collections, while forty (46.5%) libraries make some materials 
available for use only under special conditions. In forty-one cases, 
however, these restraints arise primarily from conditions imposed by 
the donor. In four cases archival discretion and concern for confi-
dentiality also govern access. Physical condition is cited as a rea-
son for restricting access or requiring special handling in only nine 
cases. The various conditions imposed include the substitution of 
microfilm for items in poor condition, limiting the use of old film, 
banning xeroxing of fragile items, and requiring cotton gloves when 
handling photographs. Use of special materials may also result in in-
creased surveillance. 
The use of photocopies or other duplicates such as typescripts 
and microfilm is, however, more widespread among the survey group. 
This widely recommended procedure calls for making substitution for 
rare, fragile, and even controversial items, and storing the originals 
in a different location. This practice prevents deterioration through 
use, reduces the opportunity for theft or mutilation, and, in the 
event the original is pilfered, provides both a record of ownership 
and an irrefutable means of identifying the item if recovered.15 
Among the manuscript departments surveyed, such substitution is widely 
exercised, with fifty-seven (66.2%) employing the practice to some 
degree. 
Use of finding aids can also prove of value in maintaining col-
lection control. The descriptions of individual items contained 
therein, likely to be of the monetarily valuable materials most sub-
ject to theft, are vital to the inventorying, identification, and re-
covery of these items. Conversely, exclusion of information about ex-
ceptionally rare or valuable items, particularly from published and 
widely circulated collection guides, may deprive the professional 
thief of vital knowledge. The massive and almost always impossible 
task of completely identifying holdings is reflected in the analysis 
of their finding aids conducted by seventy-six of the libraries par-
ticipating in this survey. Of these, forty-four (57.8%) assert that 
missing materials can be identified through information contained in 
such tools. Only fourteen (18 . 4%) of the libraries having such a re-
source report the deliberate exclusion of certain valuable materials 
from the collection guides . 
The protection of manuscripts while in use is, of course, one of 
the primary concerns of those responsible for their administration and 
preservation. One of the most controversial ways of insuring against 
theft, particularly as it is motivated by resale possibilities, is the 
marking of individual items with an indelible institutional indicium. 
The stamping of manuscripts is one of the most widely recommended 
security procedures and is preferred over embossing or perforation. 
9 
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There is a significant impediment to widespread implementation 
of this procedure: "No automatic self- feeding stamping machine has 
so far been found to do the job satisfactorily for materials which 
are as variable in size, thickness, area of inscribed surface, and 
sturdiness as the indiv1dual components of a collection of manu-
scripts . 016 For this reason, the need for selectivity in utilizing 
this measure is recognized, with the greatest attention being given 
individual items that are both valuable and marketable. The manual 
labor and time commitment involved in isolating, stamping, and record-
ing the marking of these materials also goes far in explaining the 
limited adoption of this process by the libraries surveyed. Eighteen 
(20.93%) of these institutions mark some manuscript items. Another 
three repositories report that portions of their collections are 
property-stamped, although this is not their current practice . Two 
others intend to institute such a program. No correlation can be made 
between use of this security procedure and either size or age of the 
colleCtion. 
The most comprehensive means of maintaining collection control 
is to be found, however, not in the stamping of manuscripts or the 
preparation of complete finding aids but in the production, preserva-
tion, and continual updating of such tools as shelflists and access 
logs, and in regular inventorying, at least of designated special 
items. The value of these practices is recognized to varying degrees 
by institutions which participated in this study. 
Sixty-three ( 73.25%) report the existence of a shelflist. Fifty-
three (61.62%) conduct inventories; twenty-seven of the whole collec-
tion, sixteen of special items only, and five of both. Two did not 
specify the nature of their inventory practice . Shelflists represent 
a continual updating process at thirty-one (49.2%) of the sixty-three 
repositories which produce them; another six have updated this record 
during the past year. Five repositories were engaged in such updating 
at the time this survey was conducted. Of the fifty- three departments 
which inventory their holdings, twenty- five (47 . 16%) do so on a regu-
lar basis; thirty- one conducted some form of inventory during the past 
year. 
Only twenty- nine repositories (33 . 73%) report that they maintain 
the access logs vital both in tracing thefts and establishing culpa-
bility; at least twenty of these appear to have near-complete records, 
most commonly in the form of researcher request slips. Of these 
twenty- nine repositories, nineteen (65 . 5%) report visits by 250 or 
more researchers during the previous fiscal year; these nineteen con-
stitute nearly 50 percent of those reporting this number of patrons. 
Physical protection, not only against the human foe but also 
against the hazards of the elements, can be extended to manuscripts 
through the installation of fire detection and control devices and 
through the elimination of storage are~s susceptible to water damage . 
Where these precautions fail, the shelflist and inventory along with 
complete finding aids can prove invaluable in identifying damaged or 
10 
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destroyed materials. 
The National Fire Protection Association notes that the location 
of the parent building, type of construction materials, arrangement 
of the interior, quality of storage arrangements, and proximity of 
the local fire department are all crucial elements in combatting this 
threat; but the individual manuscript department or special collec-
tion has little influence over precautions in this area other than 
soliciting the fire detection and suppression equipment necessary to 
protect its holdings adequately.17 Fourteen means of combatting fire 
have been identified by the National Fire Protection Association,18 
but in actual practice the choices of those concerned with protecting 
manuscript materials are much more limited. 
Security expert Timothy Walch reports that the water sprinkler, 
which is the most economical, and the gas device, including carbon 
dioxide and the Halon system, are most commonly used in archival situ-
ations.19 There are problems with t he use of noncombustible gas as a 
fire-fighting device because of its toxicity to humans; for many 
libraries such a system is also prohibitively expensive. Only four 
(4.87%) of the eighty-two respondents on this topic use the Halon 1301 
system, while two others (2.43%) rely on carbon dioxide. In four of 
these six cases, the system was supplemented with other preventative 
measures. 
The type of f i re protection devices more commonly employed re-
flects little of the current emphasis on control without contributing 
to damage with water or chemical agents. Sixty-six of eighty-two re-
spondents (80.48%) relied on fire extinguishers. Half as many use 
either smoke sensors (thirty-three libraries or 40.24%) or fire doors 
(thirty-four libraries or 42.68%) to control potential fire damage. 
Sixteen departments (19.51%) possess f ire hose units and twelve 
(14.63%) have sprinkler systems, while only thirteen (15.85%) employ 
temperature-sensitive detection devices. 
Some fifty-three of the eighty-two repositories providing infor-
mation about fire prevention and control efforts utilize two or more 
means of combatting or detecting this hazard. Of these, twenty-two 
(26.82%) employ two such measures, while twenty-one (25 . 6%) rely on 
three or more. The most popular combinations of devices always in-
clude fire extinguishers, reflecting economy and general library prac-
tice. Six libraries utilize extinguishers in combination with fire 
doors, five with smoke sensors, and four with hose units . Use of ex-
tinguishers, fire doors, and smoke sensors is combined by five insti-
tutions; while four depend on extinguishers, fire doors, and hose 
units. 
Sixty-four (75.29%) of the eighty-five respondents on this topic 
also prohibit smoking under all conditions; this is a precaution 
strongly recommended by both the National Fire Protection Association 
and the Committee on the Use of Manuscripts established by the Associ-
ation of Research Libraries. Of those who do permit smoking, many 
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restrict this privilege to staff members while they are not handling 
manuscript materials, or limit the practice to certain areas of the 
collection, such as the director's office. 
Perhaps more of a threat than fire is the other elemental enemy 
of paper, water. Water is omnipresent in the form of institutional 
piping and can be more difficult to control when flood situations oc-
cur. Water can also inflict substantial damage when employed in fire-
fighting. As Pamela W. Darling, head of the Preservation Department 
at Columbia University Libraries, notes in her 1978 article, "Our 
Fragile Inheritance: The Challenge of Preserving Library Materials," 
disaster in a library almost always means water .20 At least some of 
the manuscripts and departmental records of thirty (34.8%) of the 
libraries participating in this study remain where they are believed 
vulnerable to damage from this agent. 
Even the fullest preparation for disaster, whether natural or 
wreaked by human hands, is not complete as long as it remains unsup-
plemented by adequate insurance coverage. Insurance monies cannot, 
of course, replace lost or destroyed manuscript materials . But they 
can make possible the substitution of related or similar items. A 
majority of those surveyed do not possess such protection. 
When items are insured under an "agreed risk clause,"21 their 
stated value for this purpose may be the purchase price or an ap-
praised worth estimated by an expert in the field. In the case of 
manuscripts, when the items in question are not replaceable, such 
valuation becomes purely arbitrary. Under a "valued" policy, the in-
surance company accepts the stated value as the amount of the loss if 
the item is stolen or destroyed; the amount of recompense may depend 
on whether the proposed value is viewed as reasonable or on the size 
of the insurance premium the library is willing to pay.22 
Few libraries appear to take advantage of this opportunity to 
insure adequately their special collections . Only fourteen (16.27%) 
of those surveyed hold such special insurance policies on valued 
items; two others remain uncertain as to whether such coverage is 
available to them. Of the fourteen, only eight have policies that 
reflect current market values; the same number report having updated 
their coverage during the past year, with three describing this as an 
annual practice. Twelve of the fourteen possess insurance that pro-
vides for the loss of individual items. 
An equally important element of insurance protection is even more 
frequently neglected by the repositories participating in this study. 
Departmental personnel may be insured under an employee dishonesty 
bond that includes all staff without their having to be specifically 
identified. Such bonding is available in two forms: with a limit per 
employee involved in the defalcation, or with a limit per loss.23 
Only seven (9.85%) of the seventy-one ~espondents on this topic re-
port holding such insurance; another ten are ignorant of the state of 
their coverage. The seven that do insure against employee theft have 
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staffs ranging from one full-time employee to seven full-time and ten 
or more part-time per sonnel . 
The security record of manuscript repositories, judging from the 
institutions surveyed, remains a mixed one. Yet the concern for im-
proving security procedures is there. Largely small and understaffed, 
frequently underfunded and confined to antiquated and unsuitable 
quarters, many of these facilities have implemented the physic al safe-
guards and established the record-k~ping systems recommended for pro-
tecting the valuable materials under their care. 
(Part II of Ms. Martin ' s study of security practices at southern 
academic libraries, "Security Procedures and the Patron," will appear 
in the fall issue of Georgia Archive.) 
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